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With the market competition being increasingly competitive, competitions 
around business opportunity is particularly important. Not only do corporations face 
the fierce struggles from rivals for business opportunities, but prevent inner 
executives from usurping the corporate opportunities. If the corporate executives by 
his position divert the business opportunities from the corporations to himself, the 
corporations' development can go nowhere, let alone to keep the leading status in 
market competitions. Therefore, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine are created by 
English and American courts to curb the executives diverting the corporate 
opportunities. Simple to be made clear in theory as it may be, many problems may 
emerge in practice, like what is Corporate Opportunity, when the corporate 
executives may take advantage of it. Such issues have been bothering courts and 
scholars in England and the USA. The Corporate opportunity Doctrine was brought 
in China Corporation Law in 2005, thus solving these problems has become an 
important issue in the current. 
This dissertation is functionally divided into 3 parts---Introduction, Text and 
Conclusion. The text consists of 5 chapters which are around the discussion about 
corporate opportunity Doctrine, including basic theories, subjects, conduct, defenses 
and legal remedies. 
Chapter 1 centers on the corresponding legal theories and financial basis. 
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine originated from previous cases in England and 
America, differing from The Non-Compete and Self-Dealing in ranges, thus 
displaying its own value. The legal base that corporate opportunities are protected by 
law is not due to the corporations’ attributes of civil law and right, but to the duty of 
loyalty from executives. Besides, in terms of its economic analysis, it is of great use 
in decreasing agency costs and enhancing social economic efficiency.  
Chapter 2 is developed around the duty and right subjects applied to the 















directors, senior managers. In addition, the specific subjects of independent directors, 
supervisors and controlling shareholders should be regulated by the Corporate 
Opportunity Doctrine, but shoulder less blame and responsibility than ordinary staff. 
As for right subjects, corporations should are protected by the Doctrine, but 
shareholders, and creditors can’t claim the rights. 
Chapter 3 centers around the act norms of Corporate Opportunity Doctrine. 
American law applied some standard, including Interest or Expectancy Test, Line of 
Business Test, Fairness Test, et, to identify whether a usurpation exist or not; 
whereas Interest-conflicts Approach is used in England, that is, whether 
interest-conflicts exist is taken into account to determine if a usurpation happens. 
China should refer to America standard to identify the existence of usurpation. 
Chapter 4 mainly explores commonly defenses in cases, including defenses of 
inability and corporate approval. Defenses of inability encompasses the financial 
inability defense, legal inability defense and the refusal-to-deal defense. In order not 
to trigger dishonesty and immoral conduct, defenses of inability should not be 
accepted. Exemption can be approved only by the approval of related corporations. 
The rules should be elaborated, like its range and degree, qualified corporate 
organizations, independence of the members, etc. 
In Chapter 5, legal remedies are mainly discussed. In England and the USA, 
constructive trust, compensation for damages are main remedies. The constructive 
trust is extraordinarily advantageous in regulating executives’ usurpation. However, 
in China the disgorgement seems to be main remedy because of civil law tradition. 
China should improve the disgorgement system which cooperates with 
compensation for damages to achieve the best results. 
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